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Abstract
This study examines the affect of winning an Academy Award on the stock price of
parent companies. On average, receiving an Oscar has no significant impact on the stock of
parent companies during the few days surrounding the broadcast of the Academy Awards.
The findings of this study introduce questions of external interference and possible
limitations on this type of research. However, my study sheds light on future topics of
investigation for analyzing the effects of televised award shows on the stock market.
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1. Introduction
This event study examines how winning an Academy Award affects the stock of
parent companies. I predict that the parent companies of Oscar winners will see a significant
positive return on their shares the next trading day following the broadcast of the Academy
Awards. I think winning an award will increase investor confidence in parent companies by
revealing that these companies increase firm value through the funding of the United States’
most popular motion pictures.
There are only three observations that produced significant results in the entirety of
this study. In 1993 Sony Corporation realized significant cumulative abnormal returns of
6.29%, in 2006 General Electric Company had significant returns of 4.15%, and in 2009
Comcast Corporation experienced well-above average cumulative abnormal returns of
18.41%. The average abnormal return over the event window for each of these observations
resulted in values that greatly differed from their daily average return for the year that the
significant observation took place; Sony, General Electric, and Comcast realized an annual
average daily return of 0.17%, 0.04%, and 0.04%, respectively. Their average abnormal
returns over the event window were 1.26%, 0.83%, and 3.68%, respectively. This seems to
indicate that the event window does capture a period of noteworthy abnormal returns.
External events at the time of these significant observations were analyzed to determine if the
possibility of outside interference existed. Each company has a different structure that could
account for a range of stock influxes during the event window, but there is no evidence that
indicates the operations of these companies directly interfered with the experiment.
The findings of this study are quite varied, but the underlying trend reveals a negative
cumulative abnormal return for the event window. The cumulative abnormal return of
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Oscar-winning parent companies over the period of 1990 to 2009 is -0.31%; however, this
value is not significant at the 5% level. Overall, there appears to be no impact on parent
company returns for winning an Academy Award in the six categories included in this study:
Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, Best Supporting Actress, Best Director, and
Best Picture.
Follow-up statistical tests were implemented to determine if any specific award
caused a significant increase in a company’s cumulative abnormal return over the course of
the event or average abnormal return on the event date. A variable indicating if a film was of
“blockbuster” status – grossing $100 million or more in box office revenue – before the
Academy Awards and a multiple wins variable were also tested to see if the popularity of the
film or number of wins had any significant impact on the stock of parent companies. These
additional regressions produced no significant results at the 5% level. I predicted that the
more prestigious categories, such as Best Picture or Best Actor, would indicate positive
abnormal returns, but the tests show no change in parent company stock for any of the
variables included in the follow-up analysis.
This study attempts to fill the gap that exists in research on televised award
ceremonies. Extensive research has been done on a variety of broadcasted events, such as
the Super Bowl, but there exists only limited examination of the effect award ceremonies has
on the stock market. This type of research could be beneficial to entertainment companies.
Investors might view awards as indicators of a company’s success and use the information
provided by award shows as a basis for their financial decisions. I found this possibility
intriguing and decided to create an event study that measures the impact of winning an
Academy Award on parent company’s stock returns. Unfortunately, my study did not
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produce the expected results, but it does provide a basis for further research focused on the
field of award ceremonies. I hope future investigations will generate more telling
information about the impact of these ceremonies on investor decisions.
From this point forward, the text includes five remaining sections. A literature
review immediately follows the introduction and illustrates several articles that contributed to
the creation of this study. The data section comes next and contains a description of the
dataset, along with an analysis of the parent companies that supply the observations of the
experiment. The subsequent methodology section outlines the structure of the event study
and the statistical approach implemented for any calculations completed during the research
process. The results section follows, describing the outcome of all tests conducted during
this study. The last section consists of concluding statements, an analysis of possible
limitations, and suggested future research.

2. Literature Review
The inspiration for this project was the recent Michelle Obama event study.1 David
Yermack examined the affect of Michelle Obama’s clothing choices on the stock prices of
apparel companies, and he calculated that one of the First Lady’s trips to Europe in 2009
resulted in an approximate effect of $2.3 billion on the fashion industry. According to his
study, Michelle Obama has a redistribution of value affect on the industry; the stock prices of
the clothing companies she does not wear drops, while the firms responsible for the clothes
she wears realize an increase in stock prices. The fact that one individual’s clothing
decisions – a person who has no direct connection to the world of fashion – could have such
an impact on the fashion industry’s stock returns is amazing. I became interested in
1

Yermack, David. 2010. The Michelle Markup: The First Lady’s Impact on Stock Prices of Fashion
Companies. Stern School of Business, New York University. (Apr. 25): pp. 1-24.
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researching what else the public is exposed to that impacts their investment decisions. I
chose to look at the affects of televised award ceremonies. Broadcasted award ceremonies
appeared to be an area that has yet to be extensively researched. In fact, the only article that
focused on the market reaction to the Academy Awards was a study by Randy Nelson,
Michael Donihue, Donald Waldman, and Calibraith Wheaton.
Nelson et al. conducted an event study to determine the box-office worth of an
Academy Award.2 They hoped to show that moviegoers use Oscar nominations as a cue for
which films to view in theaters. Weekly box-office data was collected for both nominated
and a sample of non-nominated films during the period of 1978-1987. The researchers
attempted to value the effect of winning an Oscar on the market share of theaters, average
revenue per screen, and probability of survival once the Academy Award nominations were
announced. The authors used two main measurements: the percentage of total screens on
which the film appeared (SHARE) and the average revenue per screen (ARPS). Several
different models were implemented throughout the study to ensure the strength of the results.
The findings of the study were as the authors predicted – an overall increase in
revenue following the announcement of Oscar nominations. A ‘Best Supporting
Actor/Actress’ nomination had little statistical significance for both the SHARE and ARPS
measurement. A ‘Best Actor/Actress’ nomination only shows a significant increase in the
SHARE measurement, but a nomination for ‘Best Picture’ produced significant increases in
both measurements.3 With the ‘Best Actor/Actress’ and ‘Best Picture’ nominations
increasing predicted box-office revenues by $476,617 and $4,799,118, respectively.4

2

Nelson, Randy A. 2001. What's an Oscar worth? Economic Inquiry 39 (1) (01): 1-16.
Nelson, Ibid, 6.
4
Ibid, 15.
3

4

The duration of a film’s stay in the Top 50 film category was also examined. Nelson
et al. posed the hypothesis that a nomination could extend the length of time a film remained
in theaters and cause a film that had disappeared from theaters to be released for a second
time.5 The results again agreed with the suggested hypothesis, but the more striking finding
was the fact that it paid off to delay the release of the film. By waiting to release a film until
the fourth quarter of the year, the film’s revenues were $7,829,797 compared to only
$673,082 for those released in the first quarter.6 These results offer insight into the
distribution methodologies of major movie corporations; if distribution companies were not
previously aware of this large disparity in revenues, they could now take advantage of this
information and delay the release of films, especially those which have a chance at an Oscar.
The findings in this article are of value to the participants in the movie business, and “What’s
an Oscar Worth?” is one of the only articles that provides the industry with this type of
market information on award ceremonies.
The other studies done on the Academy Awards do not reflect the type of research I
undertake in my event study as closely as Nelson et al.’s article; however, it was interesting
to see what researchers have done with the Academy Awards thus far. Donald Redelmeier
and Sheldon Singh have completed two studies focused on how an Oscar impacts the lives of
screenwriters and actors and actresses. In one study, they determine whether there is a
correlation between success and longevity of award-winning screenwriters.7
For this article, information was collected on the winners and nominees for ‘Best
Original Screenplay’ and “Best Adapted Screenplay’ between the years of 1929-2001. The

5

Nelson, Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 16.
7
Redelmeier, Donald A., and Sheldon M. Singh. 2001. Longevity of Screenwriters who win an Academy
Award: Longitudinal Study. BMJ: British Medical Journal 323 (7327) (Dec. 22 - 29): pp. 1491-1496.
6
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median age at time of death by 2001 was 68 years. According to this study, winners had
shorter lives than nominees by 3.6 years.8 The authors are sure to state that there are many
factors that could contribute to this reduction in life for winning screenwriters with behavior
being one of the most important factors. However, the article concludes that success may
lead to worse health for some groups of individuals.
The finding of longevity in screenwriters is in stark contrast to that of the results from
Redelmeier and Singh’s second study. A total of 1649 Award-winning actors and actresses
were analyzed; 762 of them being actors and actresses nominated for “Best Actor,” “Best
Actress,” or “Best Supporting Actor/Actress” and 887 individuals were members of the same
cast and of the same sex as the nominee.9 The median age was 66 years old, and the life
expectancy for winners was 3.9 years. If an individual won multiple times, there was an
even more significant reduction in their death rate, increasing longevity by 6 years.10 The
article closes with the fact that increased longevity in celebrities may be partially explained
by their success. With the contradicting results found in Redelmeier and Singh’s articles, life
expectancy must greatly vary with occupation, even within the same industry, such as the
entertainment business.
Again, the two Redelmeier and Singh’s articles do not present the type of information
that will be discussed in my study, but these projects illustrate the possible research that can
be based on the information provided by award ceremonies. The limited number of available
studies on the Academy Awards also exhibits the lack of market research done in this area of

8

Redelmeier, Ibid, 1494.
Redelmeier, Donald A., and Sheldon M. Singh. 2001. Survival in Academy Award-Winning Actors and
Actresses. BMJ: British Medical Journal 134 (10) (May 15): pp. 955-961. (958)
10
Redelmeier, “Survival in Academy Award-Winning Actors and Actresses,” Ibid, 961.
9

6

televised award shows. One award ceremony that does offer some literature on the market
impact of its awards is the Grammy’s.
Authors Mary Watson and N. Anand examine how the Grammy’s came to influence
the album sales of nominees and winners.11 Watson and Anand were interested in answering
the longtime question of, “Does a Grammy improve record sales?” In order to answer this
question, the researchers collected album sales data for ‘Best New Artist’ nominees from the
years 1970-1994. This included the artists’ current album during the nomination and all
subsequent albums during the stated time period. They only used new artist data because
other artist could have increased their sales through previous recognition and other actions.
Each artist’s sales performance was evaluated by three variables – sales certified by RIAA
(Recording Industry Association of America), the number of albums certified ‘gold’ or
‘platinum’ by RIAA, and the number of days their certified albums continued to sell.12
According to the article, ‘Best New Artist’ winners do sell more albums than
nominees; winners sold 10.91 million units compared to nominees with only 5.4 million units
in sales.13 Since the empirical results were based on quantitative sales data, the study does
not explain why the winners sold more albums than nominees, and the authors try to find
other factors that attributed to artist’s success following the Grammy’s, such as interviews
and magazine placement. Through the use of this alternative material, Watson and Anand
show a Grammy Award is, in fact, a very useful and influential “promotional vehicle.”14
An award can be viewed as a tool used to affect the decision of investors or
consumers. This aspect of televised award ceremonies connects to the much broader field of
11

Watson, Mary R., and N. Anand. 2006. Award Ceremony as an arbiter of Commerce and Canon in the
Popular Music Industry. Popular Music 25 (1, Special Issue on Canonization) (Jan.): 41-56.
12
Watson, Ibid, 50.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, 49.
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advertising which utilizes instruments, such as television commercials or magazine ads, to
influence the decision of consumers. The National Football League’s Super Bowl seems to
have become the pinnacle of advertising competition. Millions of dollars are spent on each
30-second advertising slot during the day of the Super Bowl, and today, even individuals
who have no interest in football will watch the ‘big game’ just to see the commercials.
Authors Frank Fehle, Sergey Tsyplakov, and Vladimir Zdorovtsov investigated the
market’s reaction to the commercials of nineteen different Super Bowls over the years of
1969-2001.15 They were interested in whether or not Super Bowl commercials affect
investor behavior. If they were successful in finding a link between commercials and
investors behavior, Fehle et al. planned to focus on two main topics: what type of investors
were most influenced and whether the effects were short or long term.
The study contained information on 894 commercials and a total of 348 different
businesses.16 After each commercial was categorized by the various study-specific qualities,
such as apparent company recognition, stock data was collected for each of firm. The event
date was the Monday after each Super Bowl aired, the event window was 20-trading days
after each game, and the estimation window was 250-trading days before the 20-day window
preceding the game.17 Abnormal returns were found for those firms who were easily
identified by their ads and increased with the number of firm-specific commercials that
appeared during the Super Bowl. Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov were also able to show
that small investors were the ones whose investing decisions were influenced the most by
Super Bowl advertisements and that these returns last for a significant period after the game
15

Fehle, Frank, Sergey Tsyplakov, and Vladimir Zdorovtsov. 2005. Can Companies influence Investor
Behaviour through Advertising? Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns. European Financial
Management 11 (5) (11): pp. 625-47.
16
Fehle, Ibid, 630.
17
Ibid, 634.
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was broadcasted. Research on advertising has been quite extensive over the years, and Fehle
et al.’s study illustrates the type of examination done on advertising.
Karen Machleit, Chris Allen, and Thomas Madden have also contributed to this field
of academia and attempted to explain “how affect producing ads can influence repeat
purchasing for mature brands.”18 They realized most research in this field had focused on the
effects of ads on those consumers new to a brand, not whether the ad had any sway over the
familiar consumer. Of course, if they were to be successful in showing that ads have no
effect on repeat buyers, then mature brand advertising is economically inefficient and the
product itself is responsible for capturing the repeat consumer. However, the authors were
careful to acknowledge that advertising for mature brands is “designed more to entertain than
to communicate product benefits.”19
Commercials for Pepsi Cola and Levi’s 501 blue jeans were chosen as the test
stimuli. These commercials were placed within a 15-minute game show program to ensure
the nature of the real experiment was masked. The previous exposure to these commercials
was measured, and well above 75% of participants said that they had at least seen each
commercial once before. Brand interest – the base level of approachability, inquisitiveness,
openness, or curiosity an individual has about a brand – and other test variables were
measured through the use of a questionnaire on the day of the initial viewing and voluntary
follow-up meeting four weeks later. 20
According to Machleit, Allen, and Madden’s findings, brand interest should be the
dominant focus of mature brand advertising. The authors were forthcoming with several

18

Machleit, Karen A., Chris T. Allen, and Thomas J. Madden. 1993. The Mature Brand and Brand Interest: An
Alternative Consequence of Ad-Evoked Affect. The Journal of Marketing 57 (4) (Oct.): 72-82.
19
Machleit, Ibid, 72.
20
Ibid, 73.
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limitations of their research and state that without further empirical study of brand interest,
they do not think offering detailed marketing advice is the outcome of their research. The
results of this experiment were not, in a sense, groundbreaking, but rather, a gateway for
further examination, and the authors end the article’s discussion section with the statement,
“the possible relevance of brand interest for evaluating ad effectiveness does merit brief
consideration,” implying the importance of extended research in this area.21
Research on advertising can be very beneficial to the marketing strategies of mature
brands for it can create a renewed since of intrigue for an existing product or increase the
appeal of an unknown brand. The two articles on advertising demonstrate the detailed
research completed in that field. Hopefully one day this type of in-depth research will also
be focused on the world of televised award ceremonies, like the Oscars. When constructing
this literature review, I realized a large area of research has yet to be explored. Specifically,
with the lack of available texts and studies involving the Academy Awards, there seems to be
a hole surrounding this award ceremony. I plan to fill part of this gap with my research on
the returns to parent companies of Academy Award winners. I believe my study will
contribute to the ongoing efforts to explain the market’s reaction to award winners and how
investors’ financial decisions are based on the information provided by televised events.

3. Data Composition
I compiled a database of Academy Award winners from 1990 to 2010. In total, there
were 120 wins observed during the time period of this study. I gathered all award
information from the Academy Awards website: The Official Academy Awards Database.22
I chose this time period because it includes the most up-to-date investing techniques and was
21
22

Machleit, Ibid, 79.
Academy Awards Database: http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/ampas_awards
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a period of innovation in the film industry. The information I collected from the Academy
Awards database includes the categories of Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress,
Best Supporting Actress, Best Director, and Best Picture. Appendix 1. E lists all category
winners for the duration of the study. The six awards above are the categories that I expect
to have the greatest influence on the decision-making process of investors. They also seem
to be the categories that receive the most media coverage.
There are quite a few interesting statistics about the award data included in this event
study. Over the study’s twenty year span, there were only four directors whose films earned
them a Best Director award, but did not go on to win the award for Best Picture. These films
were Ang Lee’s Brokeback Mountain in 2005, Roman Polanski’s The Pianist in 2002, Steven
Soderbergh’s Traffic in 2000, and Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan in 1998. Clint
Eastwood was the only director to win multiple Best Picture Awards over this time period for
his 1992 film Unforgiven and his 1994 film Million Dollar Baby. Eastwood also appeared in
the Best Picture films he directed, and two other award-winning directors played a part in
their movies as well. In 1995, Mel Gibson starred in Braveheart, and in 1990, Kevin Costner
played the lead role of Dances with Wolves. Both actor/directors won the Best Director
Award, and their films also took home the award for Best Picture which is quite an
achievement. Except for Mel Gibson, the roles these actor/directors portrayed earned them a
nomination for Best Actor – Eastwood being nominated for both films he directed and starred
in. However, neither one received an award in that category.
The three individuals mentioned above – Kevin Costner, Mel Gibson, and Clint
Eastwood – were able to win an award in multiple of the six categories analyzed in this
study; the only other person to achieve this feat besides a director in the past twenty years is
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Kevin Spacey. His role in the 1999 Best Picture film, American Beauty, won him the award
for Best Actor. Prior to this success, he won the Best Supporting Actor Award in 1995 for
the character he portrayed in The Usual Suspects. There were only two other actors and one
actress that were able to win multiple awards over the span of this event study. Hilary Swank
won a Best Actress award for her roles in two Best Picture award-winning films Million
Dollar Baby and Boys Don’t Cry in 2004 and 1999, respectively. Sean Penn achieved his
multiple awards in the Best Actor category for the part he played in the 2008 film Milk and
the 2003 film Mystic River. The third actor to accomplish the feat of multiple wins in the
same category is Tom Hanks. The characters he portrayed in the 1994 film Forrest Gump
and 1993 film Philadelphia earned him the award of Best Actor. Tom Hanks is also the only
individual over the past twenty years – out of all six categories – to win an award two years
in a row. For a comprehensive list of the awards and nominations that an actor, actress,
director, or film has achieved since the commencement of the Academy Awards, please visit
the Official Academy Awards Database website.
The United States theatrical distribution information was collected for each
observation during the twenty year time period. The U.S. distribution company was used
because the study only focuses on the reaction of domestic markets. I chose the theatrical
distribution, since other forms of distribution, such as home video or DVD, may take place
long after the Academy Award broadcast. The Internet Movie Database provided the
distribution and parent company information for each film.23 With the data, I created a
summary of parent companies and the number of winners or nominations they received in
annual tables like the one found at Appendix 1. A. Once all of the preliminary information

23

Internet Movie Database: http://www.imdb.com

12

was organized, I went through each observation and made several exclusions to narrow my
original sample selection.
Sample Selection
Observations were excluded if the parent company information was not available; this
omission includes any number of wins the firm may have had during a single year. The
company that was ruled out the most for this reason is currently known as NBCUniversal,
LLC. Any wins from this company before the year 2002 are not included in my event study.
Information on exactly who benefited from Universal Pictures winning an Academy Award
during the period of 1990-2001 was not available. Universal Pictures was its own entity for
some years prior to 1990, but had several changes in ownership, including such companies as
the Canadian spirits company Seagram’s. The constant change of ownership is why the
exclusions were made. It is also important to note that NBCUniversal has split ownership;
General Electric owns 49% of the company, and Comcast owns the remaining 51%. Both
General Electric and Comcast are listed as parent companies in this study. The stock data
were separated for these two firms, but they were denoted with the same event date if
NBCUniversal film won an award.
Companies were only counted as one observation per year, even if they won awards
in multiple categories. This was the source of several exclusions from the original data
sample. However, a follow-up test does take the number of wins into consideration in order
to see if there is an impact on the returns of those companies who did receive multiple
awards in a single year. Further exclusions were made based on the fact that some firms are
privately owned. The Weinstein Company and DreamWorks Pictures are examples of
privately owned entertainment companies. Since the stock data for these firms are not
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public, it was not possible to include them in this study. The last omissions were made when
collecting the stock data for all of the included parent companies.
I accessed the Wharton Research Data Services and used the CRSP, the Center for
Research in Security Prices, database to gather daily stock data for each observation.24 Data
was collected for the year before and the year of the Oscars for the parent companies in the
final sample. This data included the holding period returns for the companies’ valueweighted returns including distributions. A table of the final sample selection is located at
Appendix 1. B. Appendix 1. C includes a list of the companies that represent at least one
observation in the study.
The table at Appendix 1. C also provides the total number of wins achieved by each
company over the duration of the study. The company that had the most wins in one year (of
the six categories I measure) was a three way tie at four of the six different award categories:
The Walt Disney Company, Time Warner, and Orion Pictures Corporation. The latter of the
three companies listed is not included in my study, but both Walt Disney and Time Warner
achieved four wins in a single year two different times in the twenty year period. For those
individuals who are curious which movies accumulated these awards, Appendix 1. D lists the
year, company, movie, and which categories were won.
Parent Company Description
The nature and structure of the companies included in the study varies greatly. Of the
nine companies that are included in the final sample selection of this event study, I would
label four as conglomerate-type businesses – The Walt Disney Company, NBCUniversal’s
General Electric Company and Comcast Corporation, and Sony Corporation. These
companies are placed in the conglomerate category for they have many business segments
24

Wharton Research Data Services: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/
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that are not directly related to the entertainment and media industry as the other firms in the
event study. It is important to identify the conglomerates of this study because their other
endeavors may affect the company’s stock price during the time of the event window. I will
now give a brief overview of the structure of each company included in this study. All firmspecific information was found online at the individual company’s official website.
The composition of NBCUniversal, LLC, provides the best example of how the
structure of a company may limit the effects of one specific event on the stock price of an
entire company. Two companies share ownership of this United States film distributor.
General Electric Company has ownership rights over 49% of the company; Comcast
Corporation owns the remaining 51% with the majority interest in the company.25 Since
NBCUniversal is almost divided in half, both split-ownership companies are included in this
study. It is difficult to tell if one side of the company realizes the effects of the Academy
Awards over the other, and the structures of the two owner firms supply the additional
possibility of outside interference during this event study.
As its own entity, NBCUniversal has a large focus in the television broadcasting
industry, including several successful channels such as Bravo, Oxygen, E! Entertainment,
and Syfy. Focus Features is one of NBCUniversal’s main movie production and distribution
companies, and this company appeared multiple times when all of the Academy Award
nomination and win data was gathered. The company also has complete ownership over the
Universal Studios Hollywood theme park and a 50% ownership stake in the Universal
Orlando Resort. These theme parks are based on the films that Universal Studios has
produced and distributed over the years. A fairly recent example of how the parks are based
on successful NBCUniversal productions is The Wizarding World of Harry Potter that
25

NBCUniversal Website: http://www.nbcuni.com/about-us/
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opened at Islands of Adventure in June 2010. Although NBCUniversal’s focal point is the
entertainment business, its parent companies General Electric Company and Comcast are not
centered on this industry.
Of the two controlling companies of NBCUniversal, Comcast Corporation is the more
entertainment driven business. Comcast claims to be one of the largest high-speed internet
and telephone services providers.26 With the majority stake in NBCUniversal, they have a
claim on all of NBCUniversal’s media ventures, even if Comcast is not directly involved in
any stage of the development process of projects, like motion pictures. This could create
problems for investors who want to invest in NBCUniversal, but do not know if their money
should go to Comcast or General Electric. The internet and communications industries are
also not directly linked to movie business, yet anyways. These industries are closely related,
but investing in a company with a focus on communications, such as telephone services, does
not mean you are also investing in the film industry.
In a recent development as of late 2009, Comcast made a bid to buy NBCUniversal
from General Electric. According to an article of the New York Times, news of the
negotiations between partial owners of NBCUniversal – Comcast and General Electric
Company – was publicized in September 2009, but apparently these companies were
deliberating for the previous seven months.27 General Electric Company finally accepted
Comcast’s in December of 2009; however, this deal was not approved by the government
until January 2011.28 The timing of this announcement only allows for a possible impact on
26

Comcast Website:
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/About/PressRoom/CorporateOverview/CorporateOverview.html
27
Arango, Tim. “G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast.” The New York Times. Media &
Advertising. December 3, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/business/media/04nbc.html.
28
Shields, Tom and Jeff Bliss. “Comcast Wins U.S. Approval to Buy NBC Universal From GE for $13.8
Billion” Bloomberg. News. January 18, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/comcast-nbcuniversal-deal-said-to-be-near-u-s-fcc-approval.html.
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the last year of this study’s dataset, 2010 (the Academy Awards ceremony for 2009 films).
This declaration of intent to purchase could affect both Comcast Corporation and General
Electric Company.
General Electric Company, commonly referred to as GE, is further removed from the
motion picture business. The company comprises of a large number of businesses in
numerous industries. The statement on their online information page exemplifies how
diverse the company is, “GE is a global infrastructure, finance, and media company taking on
the world’s toughest challenges. From everyday light bulbs to fuel cell technology, to
cleaner, more efficient jet engines, GE has continually shaped our world with
groundbreaking innovations for over 130 years.”29 The diversity of this company has many
advantages, but it causes problems for my study. I want to measure only the reactions of
those investors who use the Academy Awards as a cue for which companies to invest in. If
they feel their money will not go into the production of future motion pictures, these
investors may not want to put their funds into companies like GE. However, if investors
view winning an Academy Award as a sign of a firm making wise funding decisions, then
the aforementioned issue may not be a problem; the investor would still put their money into
General Electric even though they are not strictly an entertainment business.
The Walt Disney Company does not pose as many possible difficulties for investor
decisions as the structure of NBCUniversal; however, the company has large stakes in
markets other than the film industry. Disney divides itself into four business segments:
media networks, parks and resorts, studio entertainment, and consumer products.30 The
media network and consumer products divisions are what lead me to classify Walt Disney as

29
30

General Electric Company Website: http://www.ge.com/company/
The Walt Disney Company Website: http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/overview.html
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a conglomerate-type company. Networks such as the Disney Channel, ABC Family, ESPN
Inc., and SOAPnet are all controlled by the Walt Disney Company. Even though television
networks offer a similar service to consumers as the movie industry, they are not fully
intertwined with motion pictures.
The consumer products sector of The Walt Disney Company has grown into one of
their largest endeavors. The creation of the Disney Store – a store that sells only Disney
merchandise – shows the significance of this product market to the Disney Company.
However, this merchandising focus could be advantageous for investors, especially those
who choose to invest in companies of award-winning films. If a company releases films that
are successful enough for stores to sell merchandise based solely on those movies, another
source of profit for their investors has been created. The main motion picture companies
controlled by Disney actually appeared numerous times throughout the data collection
process for this study. Miramax Films, the entertainment branch of Disney responsible for
the company’s more serious motion pictures, dominated the nominations for the six
categories included in the study during the mid-1990 to early 2000’s, and if Disney had a win
during this period, Miramax Films was usually the U.S. distributor behind the award-winning
film.
On the corporate information page of Sony Corporation’s official website, there is
almost nothing stated about their role in the film industry.31 In fact, the list of their major
products only includes the categories: audio, video, televisions, information and
communications, semiconductors, and electronic components. Sony Corporation primarily
focuses on the electronics industry, like the creation of the PlayStation gaming console, not
motion pictures. One must look at the website for their United States subsidiary – Sony USA
31
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or Sony Corporation of America – to find information on their involvement in the
entertainment business.32 The major motion picture companies of Sony Corporation are
Columbia Pictures, TriStar Pictures (which is now consolidated into Columbia TriStar
Motion Picture Group), and Sony Picture Classics. Sony Picture Classics is much like
Miramax films of Disney; they focus on films that are not as mainstream as other Academy
Award pictures with many being foreign language films. Both Columbia Pictures and Sony
Picture Classics have films that are observations for the Sony Corporation in this study.
Since the remaining companies are more directly focused on the entertainment
industry, I will give a short description of each without the problems that may arise from
their business operations, as done above, starting with Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation
(commonly referred to as just Lionsgate). Artisan Entertainment – a production and
distribution company – was one of the most prevalent Lionsgate Companies in the dataset.
Along with motion pictures, Lionsgate also produces television series, including the
successful “Mad Men,” “Weeds,” and “South Park” series. The Lionsgate information page
made a point to state, “Lionsgate has earned 55 Academy Award® nominations and 10
Oscar® wins over the past 10 years, more than any other independent studio.”33 This shows
that film companies value their Academy Award statistics and want the public to recognize
the importance of their wins and nominations.
News Corporation almost placed into the conglomerate-type category for this study.
The company is strictly an entertainment driven company, but it is heavily involved in the
television component of the entertainment industry.34 Their portfolio includes channels such
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as the National Geographic Channel and a variety of FOX channels, ranging from news to
sports. It was interesting to discover that News Corporation also has a stake in the once
dominant social network Myspace, but even more so that this company, along with Disney
and NBCUniversal, have partnered together to create Hulu.com. According to the News
Corporation website, Hulu is “the leading online video site helping people find and enjoy the
world's premium video content when, where and how they want it.”35 I found it intriguing
that three of the companies included in this study have teamed-up to work on a single project.
The main motion picture element of News Corporation is 20th Century Fox. However, the
smaller independent film branch, Fox Searchlight Pictures is also included in the dataset.
CBS Inc. serves as a single observation of this study, and this win – for Best
Supporting Actress – was in 1990. A description of today’s structure of CBS Inc. is not
relevant for the data analyzed in this study. However, to provide a little information, the win
was through their motion picture company Paramount (now a Viacom company). CBS is
still one of the largest broadcasting companies, but during the early 1990’s, they were a
frontrunner of the entertainment business. The highly competitive nature of the movie
business seems to have limited the current success of CBS’s film companies since their
current motion picture company CBS Films did not appear at any stage of the event study.36
Viacom is actually a spin-off from CBS, Inc., taking place in the early 1970’s. The
two companies were reunited in 2000 when Viacom merged with CBS Corporation, but this
joint-venture did not last long. The companies soon parted ways only five years later in
2005. As mentioned above, Viacom owns Paramount Pictures, and this film company is
Viacom’s main contributor to the motion picture industry. Other Viacom distribution
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companies include Paramount Vantage, MTV Films, and Nickelodeon Films. The Viacom
website describes the focus of the company by stating, “Fueled by our world-class brands,
Viacom serves an ever-growing population of kids, tweens, teens and adults who want their
favorite media and entertainment, 24/7.”37 Like many of the other firms in this study,
Viacom also partakes in the televised entertainment world, and their focus on the younger
generation is shown through their networks, such as MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon, and
COMEDY CENTRAL.
The last parent company of the study is Time Warner, Inc. The main film company
of Time Warner is Warner Bros. Entertainment, and this company is responsible for the
majority of the Time Warner observations in this study.38 The other key operation of Time
Warner is the Turner Broadcasting System. However, the point of Time Warner’s history
that needs to be brought to attention for the analysis of this study is the merger between AOL
and Time Warner that took place in 2000. This merger is an example of a possible source of
problems for this event study. The AOL – Time Warner merger is labeled as one of the
worst mergers in history. In the book, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the
Ashes, author Robert F. Bruner states:
The merger of America Online (AOL) and Time Warner in 2001 offered two superlatives; the
biggest deal to date and possibly the most notorious. Nearly $200 billion in market value
evaporated in the months following the announcement of the deal. CEOs and other senior
executives of both companies resigned early or were fired. Alleged accounting chicanery
triggered a government investigation. Disaffected shareholders launched class action lawsuits.
And eventually the AOL name was expunged from the corporate moniker.39

This catastrophe takes place right in the middle of the event study’s time period, and one of
the award observations actually lists AOL Time Warner as the parent company. Outside
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events, like mergers, can skew the results of event studies because they cause different
pressures on the decision-making process of investors besides the specific one being
observed in the event study. However, even with the inclusion of AOL Time Warner’s
historic failure, the results of this study should not be significantly affected. All of the firms
in this study are part of the entertainment business, including the digital segment of the
entertainment industry, and had a stake in the internet bubble that also occurred during this
study (which happens to be one of the causes for the AOL Time Warner disaster). Each
company would have been affected by the negative consequences of the crash in this market.
With the affects of the internet market crash, most likely, having an even distribution among
media companies, I do not feel any of the data from a specific company should be excluded
for reasons connected to this incident.
Additional Analysis
Even though there are limitations from certain company characteristics as those listed
above, the study is fairly complete. There are no missing values or problems within the
information that constitutes as this event study’s dataset. All 60 observations have a complete
event and estimation window. To partially resolve the problems of limited information and
insufficient results that can arise from such a small sample of observations, I decided to run a
number of follow-up statistical tests. The variables used for these additional regressions
included the six award categories, a multiple win variable, and a “blockbuster” variable
(blockbuster meaning if a film had grossed over $100 million at the box office). The results
from the initial tests – abnormal returns on day 0, cumulative abnormal returns for the period
[-1, 1], and cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-2, 2] – were the other data utilized
for the additional investigations. The outcomes of these tests were analyzed in order to
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determine if any relationship existed between winning a certain category, winning multiple
awards, or not being a “blockbuster” before the Academy Awards were aired and the stock
returns of Oscar-winning parent companies.

4. Methodology
In order to determine whether winning an Academy Award had any effect on the
stock returns of a film’s parent company, I constructed an event study. The structure of this
event study was organized in the standard form of many other such experiments, using the
basic market model for my regressions:40
    
 is the return on company i’s stock on day t,








is the market return on day t, and



is

the error term for the individual company i on day t. The event date for this study was set as
the first trading day following the broadcast of the Academy Awards. This was typically a
Monday; however, from the years 1990 to 1998, the event date fell on a Tuesday. Starting in
1999, the Oscars were aired on a Sunday and have been ever since. The event window was
set at a length of five days, capturing the two trading days prior to the event date and the two
days thereafter. I chose this event window in order to determine if there was any market
anticipation or information leakage before the event. The estimation window was set at a
length of fifty days prior to the five days before the event date. This estimation window
length was used because it provided information for the two months preceding the Academy
Awards, but was not too far away from the event as to include a large amount of outside
occurrences. I applied different event and estimation windows to my study, but the results
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were almost identical across all variations of window length. The event window of 5 days
and the estimation window of 50 days are the measurements I decided to analyze.
Through the initial tests of my study the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns were gathered for the individual firms that captured each event date. An abnormal
return is the difference between a company’s realized return and the expected return
calculated by the regression. The calculation for abnormal returns on day 0 is shown below:41
Expected
Abnormal Actual
Return
Return
Return
AR0 =
E( ,)
, –
Once the abnormal returns were calculated, their significance was determined, and the results
from these tests were analyzed. Further regressions were constructed using the data provided
from these initial assessments.
Every observation of the study was coupled with a variable for each award category
included in this study – Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, Best Supporting
Actress, Best Director, and Best Picture. A variable for companies that won multiple awards
in these six categories was created, and there was also a variable for whether or not the movie
was a “blockbuster” before the Academy Awards aired. The variable categories were
assigned a binary coefficient of one or zero. One was given to those companies that had won
an award in that category, and a zero was given to those who had not. The multiple award
and “blockbuster” variables were also constructed as indicator variables, and a one was
allotted to those companies that had won multiple awards and to those companies that were
not of “blockbuster” status on each specific event date. The multiple win category was
established as an indicator variable because the affect on a company’s stock returns that
would result from each additional win was assumed to follow a linear trend. The
41
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construction of the blockbuster variable was somewhat subjective since the definition of a
blockbuster is an empirical question in itself. A movie was defined as a blockbuster if it had
earned more than $100 million at the box office. This $100 million estimate was discounted
by an annual 2% inflation for each year preceding 2011 to ensure an accurate measurement
of the defined blockbuster requirement. Appendix 2. A lists the Best Picture films included
in this study and the film’s box office gross before the Academy Awards were broadcasted.
Appendix 2. B contains a discount table of the $100 million equivalents for each year.
It is important to note that the variable was assigned a one if it had not grossed the
$100 million blockbuster requirement before the air date of the Academy Awards. The
release date was not taken into consideration for this variable which may slightly skew the
results. However, only four out of the twenty Best Picture films were no longer showing in
theaters at the time of the Academy Awards. The information pertaining to the blockbuster
variable was also found at the Internet Movie Database website, and the weekly box office
totals originated from the online database Box Office Mojo.42 An example of how these
variables were organized can be found at Appendix 2. C.
Separate regressions were run for each observation in the study consisting of one
dependent and one independent variable. Three different dependent variables were tested,
including the abnormal returns on day 0, the cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-1,
1], and the cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-2, 2]. A final regression was run for
each dependent variable that encompassed all eight independent variables. These follow-up
tests were implemented to determine whether any correlation existed between certain awards
and positive or negative returns to parent companies. I hoped to find a relationship between
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winning a prestigious award, such as Best Picture, and positive abnormal returns to the film’s
parent company.

5. Results
The study’s test on the event window period produced an average abnormal return on
the event date of 0.198%, but the data shows a decline in the average abnormal return on the
day following the event date with an increase in the return for the next day, as shown in
Appendix 3. A. A table is included along with the graph to show the exact average abnormal
returns on each date of the event window, see Appendix 3. B. This trend is puzzling because
there is no explanation for the dip in returns on the subsequent trading day after the event.
The total average abnormal return proved to be -0.063%. However, these results were not
significant at the 5% level which makes it difficult to interpret the overall outcome of this
study.
Since there were positive average abnormal returns on day 0 of the event window, I
created a histogram of the event date to illustrate the distribution of the results: Appendix 3.
C. The interval of [-0.25, 0.00] measured in percentages, had the highest frequency of seven
observations out of sixty. The majority of the observations were in the interval of [-1.50,
1.50]; only seventeen of the sixty companies observed abnormal returns outside of this
interval on the date of the event. Thirty-one of sixty companies had positive average
abnormal returns on the event date, but since the majority of these observations were not
significant, it is not possible to infer that the study resulted in positive average abnormal
returns for the event date.
The outcome of the cumulative abnormal return test was very similar to that of the
average abnormal return analysis for the period of the event window. The same N-shape
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pattern can be seen in the cumulative abnormal return graph of the event window, Appendix
3. D. However, unlike the average abnormal return, the cumulative return just barely reached
above zero into the positive return region. On the date of the event, the cumulative abnormal
return was 0.0006%, resulting with a total cumulative abnormal return of -0.0626% for the
event window. A table is included with the cumulative graph that shows the exact total for
each of the five days of the event, Appendix 3. E. The total cumulative abnormal return for
the entire event study – the main result of this event study – which is the average of all sixty
observation’s 5-day cumulative abnormal return was -0.3132%. The outcome of this analysis
was not as expected. I predicted there to be an overall positive cumulative abnormal return
for the event window. However, this -0.3132% return is relatively close to zero, totaling not
even a half of a percent abnormal return. This value is not significant at the 5% level with a
t-statistic of only - 0.5764, see Appendix 3. F for a summary of total event study statistics.
I created a histogram for the cumulative abnormal return for the [-2, 2] day window to
see if there was any trend or clustering of the return data: Appendix 3. G. However, there
appears to be an even distribution among the cumulative abnormal returns for the event
window, ranging from -11.17% to 18.41% return. The majority of CAR values fell between
-8% and 8% with only three observations outside of this interval. The highest frequency was
over the [2.00, 2.25] and [0.00, 0.25] percent intervals both with four firms out of sixty in
each category. Unlike the average abnormal return totals for the event date, the cumulative
abnormal returns did not have a majority of positive observations. There were only twentyseven of the sixty cumulative abnormal returns that were above a 0% return.
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Significant Observations
The only significant results of the entire study were the cumulative abnormal returns
for three companies, meaning only 5.00% of the observations in this study were significant.
The Sony Corporation had a cumulative abnormal return of 6.29% for 1993. General Electric
experienced significant cumulative abnormal returns of 4.15% in 2006. Comcast realized the
last significant abnormal returns in 2009 with a cumulative abnormal return of 18.41%.
Appendix 3. H documents these significant observations. Appendix 3. I summarizes the
awards that were won in each significant year, see Data 1. A for the films and recipients of
these awards. There was no overlap between the awards won by the three significant
observations, and one interesting point about these statistics is the fact GE and Comcast did
not produce significant cumulative abnormal returns in the same year. This seems to indicate
that the conglomerate nature of these companies might have affected the results of this study.
General Electric and Comcast should have been almost equally affected by an
NBCUniversal win in the same year, since ownership of the company is close to even: 51%
and 49%, respectively. The official company website of both General Electric and Comcast
do not indicate which owner has more involvement with or control over NBCUniversal.
However, I assume that Comcast may have been the chief overseer of the shared company. I
make this assumption based on their intention to purchase complete ownership rights of
NBCUniversal in 2009. This happens to be the same year that Comcast realized significant
cumulative abnormal returns for the event window of this study. It may be possible that
Comcast took these abnormal returns as a sign that NBCUniversal was a profitable
investment for the company – NBCUniversal is the sole motion picture branch of Comcast
Corporation. This assumption seems even more probable since the negotiations for the
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Comcast takeover supposedly started the month after the Academy Awards took place in
2009. However, assuming Comcast had more control over NBCUniversal makes it difficult
to interpret the study’s findings of significant cumulative abnormal returns for General
Electric Company in 2006.
General Electric’s significant observation was considerably lower than the other two
firms. Other observations of the study had returns well above or below those of General
Electric, yet were not significant. Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation had a cumulative
abnormal return of -11.17% over the event window in 1999 and even General Electric had a
return of -8.43% in 2009, but neither were significant values. This means GE must have
experienced comparatively low returns on average during the time period of the event study
in 2006; for example, Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation had a cumulative abnormal
return of 5.49% for their 2006 observation of the study that was not significant. According to
the company overview provided by the 2006 list of Fortune 500 companies, General
Electric’s profits had decreased 2.8% since 2004.43
One outside event that could have accounted for this low level return could be the
purchases GE made during 2006. Zenon Environmental, a water filtration technology firm,
was purchased by General Electric in 2006.44 Smiths Aerospace was in the process of being
acquired by GE in this year.45 If the market considered these acquisitions as not in the best
interest of the company’s shareholders, either of these deals could account for the decrease in
GE stock. An interesting graph found in the 2009 annual report for General Electric
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Company illustrates that 2006 was the year that GE stock started to noticeably underperform
the S&P 500.46 An adaptation of this graph can be found at Appendix 3. J. The spread
between the market index and value of GE stock indicates that 2006 was not the best year for
General Electric (and of course, the onset of the financial crisis then began and the graph
depicts how GE continued to do worse as the market fell over the next few years). However,
according to this same annual report, 2006 was the 2nd best year based on net income from
their portion of NBCUniversal between the years 2005 – 2009.47 This could be one
indication that the study did measure an impact for the year that NBCUniversal received an
Academy Award.
Comcast Corporation also offers evidence that their Academy Award win may be the
cause of some residual profits realized in their significant observation year. After the Oscars
took place, Comcast announced they would stream 2009 Academy Award winning films and
nominated films in HD – high definition – on their On Demand cable network.48 Even
though these movies were offered after the event window of this study, Comcast found a way
to incorporate their win into the other facets of their company. It may be possible that
investors took this into consideration when the NBCUniversal film won; investors might
have realized that the complementary parts of Comcast’s business could capitalize on its win.
During the year of Sony Corporation’s significant observation, the company was
developing its subsidiary Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. This company became
responsible for Sony’s consumer-based computer entertainment products.49 Even though
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public information on this company is limited because it is a privately owned firm, Sony
Computer Entertainment appears to have done well over the years, releasing products such as
the PlayStation 2, PSP, and the newest PlayStation 3. Investors could have viewed the
creation of this subsidiary as a large profit potential for the parent company. Taking the
successful track record of Sony Computer Entertainment into consideration, the 1993
investors may have been correct. The development of Sony’s subsidiary offers an example
of how external events may have caused an increase in the stock price of Sony Corporation
and affected the results of this study.
Whether the market was influenced by outside events or the investors took a
particular interest in the Academy Awards during the years of significant observations, the
returns measured for these three companies during the event window of this study were not
close to average. The average daily returns for each year that a significant observation took
place – 1993 for Sony, 2006 for GE, and 2009 for Comcast – is considerably lower than the
average abnormal return for the event window (See Appendix 3. K). On average, Sony was
realizing a daily return of 0.1653%, but their average abnormal return during the event
window was 1.2587%. The difference was not quite as drastic for General Electric with an
average return of 0.0387% and an average abnormal return for the event window of
0.8292%. However, Comcast had a daily average return of only 0.0446%, and during the
event window of this study, the company realized an average abnormal return of 3.6818%.
Even though this positive influence on the stock of Comcast was measured during the event
period of 2009, it is difficult to interpret these significant observations, especially when
comparing just three results to the outcome of the study as a whole.
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The graphs of the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window of all three
significant observations show no real correlation between the shape of their trend lines and
that of the overall cumulative abnormal return graph for the study (See Appendix 3: L, M,
and N). The graphs for Sony and Comcast show a decreasing trend of cumulative abnormal
returns, and General Electric’s graph depicts a positive slope for the cumulative abnormal
returns during its significant observation. No real assumptions can be made for the whole
study based on three data points, and it is even more difficult to interpret these results when
the significant events do not reflect the overlying trend for cumulative abnormal returns
found in the study.
Additional Analysis
All values produced by the follow-up statistical tests were not significant – view the
summary statistics for the average abnormal returns on the event date, cumulative abnormal
returns for the period [-1, 1], and the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window [-2,
2] located at Appendix 3: O, P, and Q, respectively. The highest R-squared value of the
study was produced by the all inclusive regression on the cumulative abnormal returns for the
[-1, 1] window: 0.1051; this means only 10.51% of the variation in the cumulative abnormal
returns for that window was explained by the changes in test variables. However, this all
inclusive regression did not have the highest Adjusted R-squared value of all additional
regressions. It did have the highest Adjusted R2 value of the three all inclusive tests of
-0.0353, but this negative value indicates that there are variables included in this regression
that do not help to predict the outcome of the test. The Best Actress variable from the
regression on abnormal returns for the event date produced the highest Adjusted R2 of the
study: 0.0128. Since this value is still considerably low, it further emphasizes that the Best
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Actress variable does not offer an explanation for a parent company’s abnormal returns. I
provide an overview of the results produced by the additional tests, but it is important to keep
in mind these results do not affect the dependent variables of this study and all coefficients
can be equated to zero, since there was no evidence of significance.
The variable for an award in the Best Actor category resulted in a negative coefficient
for all regressions. The Best Actor variable was the only variable that produced a negative
coefficient for all three trials. The majority of the coefficients produced from the three tests
were negative with thirty-three negative results out of forty-eight coefficients, excluding the
intercept. A significant negative coefficient would imply that if a company won the variable
award, they would actually realize a decrease in their stock price, and this is the complete
opposite of the hypothesis stated at the beginning of the study – winning an award will result
in positive abnormal returns for a parent company. However, the coefficients generated in
this study were typically not close to significance at the 5% level.
Some variables did produce fairly large coefficients, even though they were not
significant. The variables that had coefficient greater than an absolute value of 2% were the
Best Actor and Best Actress variables of the regression on the cumulative abnormal returns
for days [-1, 1] with values of -2.33% and -2.23%, respectively, and all eight variables of the
regression on the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window, except the Best Picture
award variable, were above an absolute value of 2%. The Best Director variable reached
-3.31%, but the only positive coefficients of this regression were the multiple wins and
blockbuster variables with values of 2.69% and 2.10%, respectively. These positive
coefficients of around 2-3% were the type of results I was expecting to find from running the
additional regressions on the event study dataset. The all inclusive variable regressions that
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produced the highest coefficients generated the significance test statistics closest to being
significant at the 5% level as well. The individual variable closest to significance was the
Best Actor variable in the cumulative abnormal regression for the period [-1, 1] around the
event date, having a coefficient of -2.33% with a t-statistic of -1.94% and p-value of 0.058.
One variable produced positive coefficient results across all regressions, except the
three all inclusive regressions: the Supporting Actress award variable. However, there does
not seem to be a reasonable explanation for why this Supporting Actress variable would have
positive results while none of the other award variables did, especially those that tend to
carry more prestige for companies, like Best Picture. Since this variable was not even close
to being significant, t-test values of 0.18, 0.19, 0.26 and p-values of 0.860, 0.851, 0.798 for
the individual variable regressions, there is no need to dwell on this fact for any amount of
time. It is of more interest to examine a variable that had five out of the six possible
coefficients result in positive values – the blockbuster variable. Even though the results were
not significant (a table of p-values and t-test statistics is included at Appendix 3. R), they
provide a good example of the t-test and p-value statistics that were realized across all of the
regressions.
The blockbuster variable was established based on the idea that investors may be
more willing to invest in those companies whose films had not grossed a significant amount
of money before the Academy Awards, yet still managed to win the Best Picture Award at
the Oscars. Over the event study’s twenty year period only eight films qualified for “nonblockbuster” status (see Appendix 2. A for more details on the blockbuster variable films). I
was hoping to find results that supported the possible investing rationale of being impressed
by the success of a film that was not as well-known and considering the Oscar win a huge
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achievement for its parent company, showing that the parent company knows how to make
wise decisions when funding projects that may be off the radar. Of the eight Best Picture
winners that had not grossed the $100 million equivalent amount by the Academy Awards,
six of them were still in theaters. Of these six films, after the award was announced five of
them went on to gross over their respective $100 million equivalent before exiting theaters,
Appendix 3. S. For example, in 1993, Schindler’s List – a non-blockbuster film before the
Oscars – grossed a total of 34.49% above its equivalent value while in theaters. With five of
the six films that were still in theaters at the time of the awards going on to become
blockbusters after winning the Best Picture Award, there appears to be revenue generated for
the parent companies of these smaller films from the announcement of the Best Picture
Award; however, the regression on the blockbuster variable did not produce any significant
values that would explain this revenue as a result of winning an Oscar.
The other non-award variable – the multiple win category – produced varying and
some counterintuitive results. Four of the six possible coefficients were negative. I was
expecting to see significant positive abnormal returns for this variable, meaning an increase
in a company’s return if they were successful in more than one of the six award categories
chosen for this study. The only regression that realized an increase in abnormal returns close
to what I expected for the multiple win variable was the all inclusive regression for the entire
event window, producing a coefficient of 2.69%. Unfortunately, all results for the multiple
award variable were also not significant.

6. Conclusion
This study was constructed based on the hypothesis that winning an Academy Award
in one of the six major categories presented at the Oscars would produce positive abnormal
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returns for the parent company of the award-winning film. However, this was not the
outcome of the study. Almost all of tests conducted generated values that were not
significant. Only three of the sixty observations included in this study significant produced
significant cumulative abnormal returns over the event window at the 5% level. These
results are difficult to interpret, and it is also hard to determine if there were high levels of
outside interference that may have skewed the results. Overall, I conclude there are two
possible explanations for the findings of this event study – one where the lack of significance
is to be expected and one where the lack of significance indicates a cause for concern.
First, investors may have anticipated the results of the Academy Awards well before
the actual broadcast of the show. These predictions would have been included into their
previous investment decisions, and there is no residual to what has already been anticipated.
This conclusion means investors must be quite good at predicting Oscar winners; however,
this also poses problem for the study as a whole, finding no significant results amplifies the
fact that there were problems with the study. Parent companies should have been realizing
positive abnormal returns through the event window if investors based part of their earlier
decisions on the predictions they made. From the lack of significant findings, this conclusion
does not appear to be supported by the results of my study.
The outcome of this experiment could also be interpreted as, on the margin, there are
no additional cash flows to Academy Award-winning companies immediately following the
Oscar broadcast. Under this conclusion, parent companies would not realize any significant
returns from winning an award. The lack of significant results is not as problematic because
if there are no cash flows for winning an award, there is nothing to measure. This
explanation is plausible because only a small number of observations were significant in the
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original cumulative abnormal returns test – three out of sixty – and no further significant
results were found.
I do not think it is possible to determine which conclusion best fits the results of this
event study. The second option where winning an award has no effect on the market price of
parent companies’ stock does not seem feasible, but I do not fully support the idea that
investors incorporate their predictions into their investment plan before the Oscars actually
take place. The best interpretation appears to be a third option that combines the two
conclusions laid out above. Some investors may form predictions when the Academy Award
nominees are announced – typically four weeks before the ceremony’s broadcast – and
include these predictions into their investment decisions. This conclusion follows Randy
Nelson, et al.’s article “What’s an Oscar Worth?” which illustrates that people use Oscar
nominations as cues for which movies to view in theaters.50 Investors may do the same,
using the nominee announcements as an indicator for which company to fund instead of
waiting to see which films win the awards as my study suggests. The second conclusion
would be combined in such a way that states winning an Oscar in the award categories of
Best Supporting Actor or Best Supporting Actress would not produce significant abnormal
returns for the film’s parent company. However, even if the combination of the outlined
conclusions provides a better explanation for this study’s results, another experiment would
need to be constructed in order to test this new hypothesis.
Limitations
The results of this study are difficult to interpret because of the plethora of possible
conclusions, but even more so for the many limitations on the project. One of the main
implications of this study was the limited sample selection. Almost half of the observations
50

Nelson, Ibid.
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had to be removed from the original dataset. When constructing this experiment, I had
planned to include nominations which would have meant a significant increase in the number
of observations. However, after further deliberation I realized the study could not include
nominee information for what I intended to measure with my analysis. Since winners are
also nominated, it was not possible to differentiate between those companies who had just
been nominated and those who won an award. Many companies were nominated for a
number of different films within a given year, but only won an award for a single film that
year. For example in 2006, Viacom had Dreamgirls nominated for Best Supporting Actor
and Best Supporting Actress; Babel with two nominations for Best Supporting Actress and a
nomination for Best Director and Best Picture; and Letters from Iwo Jima nominated for Best
Director and Best Picture. However, the only award Viacom won that year was Best
Supporting Actress. There would be no way to distinguish the affects of winning an award
and being nominated for the other films.
The timeline of this event also includes the beginning of our current recession. The
market as a whole has preformed below par for the past few years, starting around the end of
2007. The existing conditions have taken a toll on the economy, and it seems firms across a
variety of industries would have had difficulty realizing any significant positive returns
during this period. The study’s results from these years could reflect the poor investing
climate and not the actual effect of winning an award that would be realized in a healthy
market environment. However, it was not possible to cut those years from the study, since
the dataset already faced the restraint of a diminished size.
Outside interference was also a large limitation, especially for those firms labeled as
conglomerate-type businesses that partake in a wide range of industries. There was no
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thorough way to fully reduce the possibility of peripheral events affecting the stock of the
parent companies included in this study. Interference is a problem for most event studies; it
is difficult to form a question well enough to measure just the result of a specific event. The
stock market is interconnected to a degree that makes it near impossible to eliminate all
outside interference. This results in studies that may measure not only the affects of an
event, such as winning an Academy Award, but also the influence of other company
decisions or incidents.
Future Research
I would like to see future research build upon this study; my first suggestion would be
to expand the study’s timeline to see if there is any change in the outcome. Parent company
data may be difficult to find for the early years of the Academy Awards, but I think a larger
dataset would produce more significant results. As stated above, alternative tests are possible
if stock data is compiled for Academy Award nominees, but what the test plans to measure
would have to be clearly defined. A study could calculate the difference in returns between
those companies that are just nominated for an award and those film’s that go on to win an
Oscar. This experiment would try to determine if winning an award has a greater affect on
parent company stock than just being nominated for an award.
Further research on award ceremonies can benefit those companies that aim at
winning an Academy Award. Not only does an Oscar provide a level of prestige, but with
studies like this one, companies would know how much profit to expect from winning an
award. My study demonstrates only one of the possible questions that have yet to be
answered surrounding the Academy Awards. The world of televised award ceremonies
remains wide open for future research and investigation.
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Appendix
1. A

Table of 2010 Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the wins and nominations each parent company received at the 2010
Academy Awards that aired February 27, 2011 and exemplifies how the initial data collection
was organized.
2010
27-Feb-11
Companies
Wins Nominations
Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation
5
Viacom
2
9
Sony Corporation
4
News Corporation
1
5
The Weinstein Company
3
6
Time Warner
2
NBCUniversal
3
The Walt Disney Company
1

1. B

Table of Sample Selection
The table shows the original sample size and the exclusions made during the sample selection
process. There were originally 120 firms, but half of the observations were cut due to reasons
such as no available stock data for privately owned companies or an individual company
received multiple awards during the Oscars ceremony. This table also includes an addition to
the sample size from the split ownership of NBCUniversal between General Electric
Company and Comcast Corporation, resulting in a final sample size of 60 observations.
Observation
Number of firms
Original Sample Size
120
Addition from NBCUniversal Split
4
Total Additions
4
No Parent Company Information
19
Multiple Wins
32
Private Company
13
Total Exclusions
64
Final Sample Selection
60
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1. C

Parent Company Observation Statistics
This table illustrates the distribution of observations among the nine parent companies
included in the study. Time Warner, Inc. and The Walt Disney Company comprised the
majority of the sixty observations with thirteen wins each. General Electric Company and
Comcast Corporation have partial ownership of NBCUniversal, and both parent companies
are listed as separate observations in this study.
Company Name
CBS Inc.
NBCUniversal, LLC.
– Comcast Corp.
– General Electric Co.
Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.
News Corp.
Sony Corp.
Time Warner Inc.
Viacom Inc.
The Walt Disney Co.
Total

1. D

Total Number of Wins
1
(4)
4
4
4
6
10
13
5
13
60

Parent Companies that achieved the Most Oscars in a Single Year
This table lists the companies that won the most Academy Awards in a single year during the
period of 1990-2010 and also the Oscars they won in that respective year. The Walt Disney
Company, Time Warner, and Orion Pictures Corporation tied with a total of four wins each at
one awards ceremony; however, Orion Pictures is a privately owned corporation and does not
appear in the sample selection of this study.

Year

Company
Name

2007

The Walt
Disney Co

2004

2003

1998

1991

Time
Warner

Time
Warner

The Walt
Disney Co
Orion
Pictures
Corp

Movie Title
There Will
Be Blood
No Country
for Old Men
Million
Dollar Baby
Mystic
River
The Lord of
the Rings:
The Return
of the King
Life is
Beautiful
Shakespeare
in Love
The Silence
of the
Lambs

Best
Actor

Best
Supporting
Actor

Best
Actress

Best
Supporting
Actress

Best
Director

Best
Picture

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

44

X

X
X

X

1. E

Year
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Category Winners 1990-2010
All winners of the six categories included in this study are listed in the table. The winners of
2010 are not included in the study. The 2011 stock data was not yet available, but since it was
the most up-to-date Academy Awards, I chose to include it these summary statistics.
Best
Best
Best
Best
Best
Best
Supporting Supporting
Actor
Actress
Director
Picture
Actor
Actress
Colin
Natalie
Christian
Melissa
Tom
The King's Speech
Firth
Portman
Bale
Leo
Hooper
Jeff
Sandra
Christoph
Kathryn
Mo'Nique
The Hurt Locker
Bridges
Bullock
Waltz
Bigelow
Sean
Kate
Heath
Penélope
Danny
Slumdog Millionaire
Penn
Winslet
Ledger
Cruz
Boyle
Daniel
Marion
Javier
Tilda
Joel Coen & No Country for Old
Day-Lewis
Cotillard
Bardem
Swinton
Ethan Coen
Men
Forest
Helen
Alan
Jennifer
Martin
The Departed
Whitaker
Mirren
Arkin
Hudson
Scorsese
Philip S.
Reese
George
Rachel
Ang
Crash
Hoffman
Witherspoon Clooney
Weisz
Lee
Jamie
Hilary
Morgan
Cate
Clint
Million Dollar Baby
Foxx
Swank
Freeman
Blanchett
Eastwood
The Lord of the
Sean
Charlize
Tim
Renée
Peter
Rings: The Return
Penn
Theron
Robbins
Zellweger
Jackson
of the King
Adrien
Nicole
Chris
Catherine
Roman
Chicago
Brody
Kidman
Cooper
Zeta-Jones
Polanski
Denzel
Halle
Jim
Jennifer
Ron
A Beautiful Mind
Washington Berry
Broadbent
Connelly
Howard
Russell
Julia
Benicio
Marcia
Steven
Gladiator
Crowe
Roberts
Del Toro
Gay Harden Soderbergh
Kevin
Hilary
Michael
Angelina
Sam
American Beauty
Spacey
Swank
Caine
Jolie
Mendes
Roberto
Gwyneth
James
Judi
Steven
Shakespeare in Love
Benigni
Paltrow
Coburn
Dench
Spielberg
Jack
Helen
Robin
Kim
James
Titanic
Nicholson
Hunt
Williams
Basinger
Cameron
Geoffrey
Frances
Cuba
Juliette
Anthony
The English Patient
Rush
McDormand Gooding, Jr. Binoche
Minghella
Nicolas
Susan
Kevin
Mira
Mel
Braveheart
Cage
Sarandon
Spacey
Sorvino
Gibson
Tom
Jessica
Martin
Dianne
Robert
Forrest Gump
Hanks
Lange
Landau
Wiest
Zemeckis
Tom
Holly
Tommy
Anna
Steven
Schindler's List
Hanks
Hunter
Lee Jones
Paquin
Spielberg
Al
Emma
Gene
Marisa
Clint
Unforgiven
Pacino
Thompson
Hackman
Tomei
Eastwood
Anthony
Jodie
Jack
Mercedes
Jonathan
The Silence of the
Hopkins
Foster
Palance
Ruehl
Demme
Lambs
Jeremy
Kathy
Joe
Whoopi
Kevin
Dances With Wolves
Irons
Bates
Pesci
Goldberg
Costner
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2. A

Best Picture Films and Blockbuster Box Office Gross Revenue Statistics
The table displays all Best Pictures award winners from 1990 to 2010 and the amount each
film grossed at the U.S. box office while in theaters. The highlighted films are those that were
not of “blockbuster” status at the time the Academy Awards aired, grossing less than the
equivalent of $100 million in today’s terms. The films that were out of theaters by the date of
the Academy Awards are marked with a double star (**). Only thirteen out of the twenty-one
films displayed above were part of the blockbuster regression. The other films were
productions of privately owned companies or excluded from the study for a different reason;
the year 2010 was not included in the event study, since the stock data was not yet available
for 2011. These omitted observations are indicated by a carrot (^).
Year
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Event Date
27-Feb-11
7-Mar-10
22-Feb-09
24-Feb-08
25-Feb-07
5-Mar-06
27-Feb-05
29-Feb-04
23-Mar-03
24-Mar-02
25-Mar-01
26-Mar-00
21-Mar-99
23-Mar-98
24-Mar-97
25-Mar-96
27-Mar-95
21-Mar-94
29-Mar-93
30-Mar-92
25-Mar-91

Film
The King's Speech^
The Hurt Locker**^
Slumdog Millionaire
No Country for Old Men
The Departed
Crash**
Million Dollar Baby
The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King
Chicago
A Beautiful Mind^
Gladiator^
American Beauty^
Shakespeare in Love
Titanic
The English Patient
Braveheart
Forrest Gump
Schindler's List^
Unforgiven**
The Silence of the Lambs**^
Dances With Wolves^
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Gross ($)
114,231,030
12,647,089
98,354,395
64,291,179
131,805,297
53,382,847
64,851,738
364,115,612
134,014,534
154,704,651
186,870,377
108,468,063
73,192,745
494,514,331
63,154,818
73,512,126
318,434,225
59,849,473
74,681,912
130,719,208
139,106,936

2. B

2010 $100 Million Discounted Equivalents
The table shows the dollar amounts that are equivalent to $100 million in 2010. This
information was used to determine if a film was of blockbuster status before the Academy
Awards broadcast. The annual inflation rate was estimated to be 2%.

2009
98,039,216
2004
88,797,138
1999
80,426,304
1994
72,844,581

2. C

Blockbuster Discount Table
Annual Inflation Rate: 2%
2010: $100,000,000
2008
2007
2006
96,116,878 94,232,233 92,384,543
2003
2002
2001
87,056,018 85,349,037 83,675,527
1998
1997
1996
78,849,318 77,303,253 75,787,502
1993
1992
1991
71,416,256 70,015,937 68,643,076

2005
90,573,081
2000
82,034,830
1995
74,301,473
1990
67,297,133

Additional Test Variables
This table illustrates how the information for the follow-up regressions was organized. All
variables were structured as indicator variables: one indicating a win and zero signifying a
loss. For the multiple win variable, a one indicated multiple awards for that parent company
in a single year. A one for the blockbuster variable meant the parent company won the Best
Picture category that year, but the film did not reach the $100 million equivalent before the
Academy Awards broadcast.

3. A

comnam
DISNEYWALT CO

actor
1

actress
0

sup_actor
1

sup_actress
0

picture
1

director
1

multi_win
1

blockbuster
1

Average Abnormal Return for Each Day of the Event Window
The graph shows the daily average abnormal return for all sixty observations over the event
window. The table located at 3. B contains the exact values that are represented in this chart.
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-0.0040
-0.0050
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3. B

Average Abnormal Returns for the Event Window
This table lists the daily average abnormal return for all sixty observations over the event
window of the study. The total average abnormal return is also included.
Day Average Abnormal Return (%)
-2
-0.1659707
-1
-0.0305748
0
0.1984690
1
-0.4573080
2
0.1421685
Total Average Abnormal Return (%)
-0.0626432

3. C

Average Abnormal Returns on the Event Date
The histogram displays the distribution of average abnormal returns for all sixty observations
on the event date of the study – the next trading day following the Academy Awards
broadcast. The range with the highest frequency of seven out of the sixty observations was
the [-0.25, 0.00] category.
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1
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2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7

Frequency

6

Abnormal Returns [Day 0] (%)

48

3. D

Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window
The graph illustrates the cumulative abnormal return of the sixty observations of this study
over the event window. Table 3. E contains the exact values for the five days represented on
this chart.
0.0002
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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-1

0

1

2
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-0.0010
-0.0012
-0.0014
-0.0016
-0.0018

3. E

Days from Event Date

Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Event Window
This table summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns of all sixty observations over the
event window of the study.
Day Cumulative Abnormal Return (%)
-2
-0.1659707
-1
-0.0982728
0
0.0006412
1
-0.1138461
2
-0.0626432

3. F

Event Study Statistics
The table displays the statistics for the entire event study. The total cumulative abnormal
return for all sixty observations over the event window and the corresponding variance and
t-test statistic are shown.
Number of
Total Cumulative
T-Test
Variance
Observations Abnormal Return (%)
Statistic
60
-0.31322
0.0017714 -0.5764494
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3. G

Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Event Window
This histogram shows the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns of all sixty
observations over the event window of this study. No overlying trend appears in the data, but
the majority of observations were negative. The range with the highest frequency is a tie
between the [0.00, 0.25] and [2.00, 2.25] categories with four observations each.
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3. H

Significant Cumulative Abnormal Returns
The table displays the three observations of this study that were significant at the 5% level.
The cumulative abnormal return and t-test statistic is shown for the 1993 Sony Corporation,
2006 General Electric Company, and 2009 Comcast Corporation observations.
Event Date Company Name CAR (%) T-Test Statistic
03/30/93
Sony Corp
6.2935
2.3018
03/06/06
General Electric Co
4.1461
2.8474
02/23/09
Comcast Corp
18.4091
4.5765

3. I

Significant Observation Awards
This table summarizes the awards each parent company won during their respective
significant observation years. There was no overlap of the awards achieved by each company
and the categories Supporting Actress and Best Picture do not account for a significant
observation win.

Event Date

Company Name

03/30/93
03/06/06
02/23/09

Sony Corp
General Electric Co
Comcast Corp

Actor

Supporting
Actor

Actress

Supporting
Actress

Director

X
X
X
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X

Picture

3. J

Financial Performance Comparison between General Electric and S&P 500
The chart compares the financial performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index and
the stock of General Electric Company and shows the difference in outcomes if $100 was
invested in each company on December 31, 2004 and measured annually for the following
five year period. All quarterly dividends were reinvested, and the total cumulative dollar
returns represent the value these investments would have December 31, 2009. This graph is
an adaptation of the “Comparison of Five-Year Cumulative Return among GE, S&P 500, and
Dow Jones Industrial Average” graph found in the 2006 Annual Report of General Electric
Company. The table displays the exact dollar values of each investment during the five year
period.
140
Cumulative Return ($)

120
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40
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20
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Year

GE
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3. K

2004
100
100

2005
99
105

2006
108
121

2007
111
128

2008

2009
51
81

49
102

Significant Observation Annual Average Daily Return and Average Abnormal
Returns for the Event Window
This table shows the annual average daily return and the average abnormal returns for the
event window of the three significant observations of the study.
Company Name

Year

Sony Corporation
General Electric Company
Comcast Corporation

1993
2006
2009

Annual
Event Window
Average Return (%) Average Abnormal Return (%)
0.1653
1.2587
0.0387
0.8292
0.0446
3.6818
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3. L

1993 Sony Corporation Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window
The chart displays the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the
1993 Sony Corporation significant observation.
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2006 General Electric Company Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event
Window
The chart shows the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the
2006 General Electric Company significant observation.
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1

2

3. N

2009 Comcast Corporation Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window

Cumulative Abnormal Return

The chart displays the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the
2009 Comcast Corporation significant observation.
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3. O

Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Abnormal Returns on
the Event Date
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each
additional regression ran on the abnormal returns realized by the sixty observations of this
study on the event date. The coefficient and standard error term of the intercept and adjusted
r-squared of each regression are also included.

Dependent Variable: Abnormal Returns on Event Date
Regressor
1
2
3
4
5
Best Actor

6

7

9
-0.0079
(0.0074)
-0.0020
(0.0073)
-0.0103
(0.0080)
-0.0038
(0.0082)
-0.0008
(0.0107)
-0.0046
(0.0103)
-0.0019
(0.0102)
0.0056
(0.0111)
0.0094
(0.0070)
-0.0716
60

0.0015
(0.0052)

Supporting
Actor
Best
Actress
Supporting
Actress
Best
Director
Best
Picture
Multiple
Wins

-0.0072
(0.0055)
0.0009
(0.0048)
-0.0005
(0.0054)
-0.0017
(0.0055)
-0.0044
(0.0047)

0.0016
(0.0027)

0.0036
(0.0025)

0.0017
(0.0028)

0.0021
(0.0026)

0.0023
(0.0026)

0.0037
(0.0029)

-0.0007
(0.0076)
0.0021
(0.0024)

-0.0158
60

0.0128
60

-0.0167
60

-0.0171
60

-0.0157
60

-0.0016
60

-0.0171
60

Blockbuster
Intercept

8

-0.0049
(0.0049)

0.0034
(0.0027)

Summary Statistics
Adj. R2
n

-0.0004
60
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3. P

Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Cumulative Abnormal
Returns for the Period [-1, 1] around the Event Date
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each
additional regression ran on the cumulative abnormal returns realized by the sixty
observations of this study over the period [-1, 1] around the event date. The coefficient and
standard error term of the intercept and adjusted r-squared of each regression are also
included.

Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-1, 1]
Regressor
1
2
3
4
5
Best Actor

6

7

9
-0.0233
(0.0120)
-0.0196
(0.0119)
-0.0223
(0.0130)
-0.0181
(0.0134)
-0.0158
(0.0173)
-0.0047
(0.0167)
0.0133
(0.0162)
0.0189
(0.0180)
0.0179
(0.0114)
-0.0353
60

-0.0060
(0.0085)

Supporting
Actor
Best
Actress
Supporting
Actress
Best
Director
Best
Picture
Multiple
Wins

-0.0060
(0.0091)
0.0015
(0.0080)
0.0013
(0.0089)
0.0053
(0.0091)
-0.0028
(0.0077)

-0.0013
(0.0044)

-0.0016
(0.0042)

-0.0034
(0.0046)

-0.0032
(0.0043)

-0.0041
(0.0042)

-0.0018
(0.0048)

0.0087
(0.0125)
-0.0038
(0.0040)

-0.0085
60

-0.0097
60

-0.0166
60

-0.0169
60

-0.0113
60

-0.0150
60

-0.0089
60

Blockbuster
Intercept

8

-0.0100
(0.0081)

0.0001
(0.0045)

Summary Statistics
Adj. R2
n

0.0085
60
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3. Q

Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Cumulative Abnormal
Returns for the Event Window
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each
additional regression ran on the cumulative abnormal returns realized by the sixty
observations of this study over the event window. The coefficient and standard error term of
the intercept and adjusted r-squared of each regression are also included.

Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-2, 2]
Regressor
1
2
3
4
5
Best
Actor
Supporting
Actor
Best
Actress
Supporting
Actress
Best
Director
Best
Picture
Multiple
Wins

6

7

9
-0.0257
(0.0188)
-0.0327
(0.0186)
-0.0217
(0.0205)
-0.0241
(0.0210)
-0.0331
(0.0272)
-0.0048
(0.0263)
0.0269
(0.0254)
0.0210
(0.0282)
0.0224
(0.0178)
-0.0735
60

-0.0155
(0.0130)
0.0026
(0.0141)
0.0032
(0.0123)
-0.0043
(0.0137)
0.0037
(0.0141)
-0.0020
(0.0119)

0.0010
(0.0067)

-0.0037
(0.0066)

-0.0042
(0.0071)

-0.0021
(0.0066)

-0.0039
(0.0066)

-0.0024
(0.0074)

0.0081
(0.0193)
-0.0039
(0.0061)

0.0071
60

-0.0166
60

-0.0161
60

-0.0155
60

-0.0160
60

-0.0167
60

-0.0142
60

Blockbuster
-0.0007
(0.0069)

Intercept

8

-0.0081
(0.0126)

Summary Statistics
Adj. R2
n

3. R

-0.0101
60

Blockbuster Variable Statistics
The table displays statistics for the blockbuster variable of each regression ran during the
follow-up tests of the study, consisting of the regression on the average abnormal returns on
the event date, cumulative abnormal return for the period [-1, 1] around the event date, and
the cumulative abnormal return for the event window. The t-test and p-value statistics for
each blockbuster variable are also included.

Regression
Abnormal
Return Day 0
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return [-1, 1]
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return [-2, 2]

Individual
Variable
Regression (%)

Individual
T-Test

Individual
P-Value

All Inclusive
Variable
Regression (%)

All
Inclusive
T-Test

All
Inclusive
P-Value

-0.07

-0.10

0.92

0.56

0.51

0.61

0.87

0.69

0.49

1.89

1.05

0.30

0.81

0.42

0.68

2.10

0.74

0.46
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3. S

Films that achieved Blockbuster Status after the Academy Awards Ceremony
This table contains the total box office gross revenue values of the five Best Picture films that
went on to reach blockbuster status after the Academy Awards broadcast. The films listed
received an indicator value of 1 for the follow-up regressions of the study, meaning they were
not of blockbuster status at the time of the Oscars ceremony. However, these films exceeded
their $100 million equivalent after receiving the Best Picture Award at the Academy Awards
in their respective years, and the amount by which they surpassed their $100 million
equivalent is also displayed in the table. See Appendix 2. B for the summary of equivalent
values for the period of 1990 to 2010.

Year

Film

2004
1998
1996
1995
1993

Million Dollar Baby
Shakespeare in Love
The English Patient
Braveheart
Schindler’s List

Total Domestic
Box Office Gross ($)
100,422,786
100,241,322
78,651,430
75,609,945
96,045,248
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Gross Above
$100 million
Equivalent (%)
13.09
27.13
3.78
1.76
34.49

